District Court Holds That Any Failure to Mark During the Damages Period Bars All Pre-Notice Damages

January 17, 2025

Reading Time : 2 min

By: Jason Weil, Rubén H. Muñoz, Shivani Prakash

The District of Arizona recently held that a plaintiff’s failure to mark patented products during the time period that marking was required barred it from recovering all pre-notice damages, including for a period of time when there was no obligation to mark.

Plaintiff accused defendant of infringing patents directed to heat management technology for certain lighting products such as LEDs. During the potential damages period, plaintiff had licensed the asserted patents to a third party that sold products covered by the patents, but did not mark them with the patent number. Accordingly, there was first a time period when the patent had issued but there were no patented products on sale, then a second time period when unmarked patented products were sold. Then plaintiff sent a notice letter and ultimately filed suit. Both parties moved for summary judgment related to whether the marking statute, 35 U.S.C. § 287, limited plaintiff’s ability to recover pre-suit damages.

Plaintiff argued that § 287 did not preclude recovery of damages prior to plaintiff’s license with third parties who failed to mark because, prior to that date, there was no obligation to mark. And because it provided actual notice of infringement via a letter a month later, any limitation on plaintiff’s recovery (up to six years prior to the complaint) should only affect that intervening month. Defendant argued that according to the statutory language, a failure to comply with § 287 bars all pre-notice damages. Moreover, plaintiff’s notice letter was insufficient to provide actual notice of infringement because it failed to identify all allegedly infringing products. Thus, plaintiff should be prohibited from recovering any pre-suit damages.

The court first set forth the relevant statutory language: “In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee [unless] the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.” § 287(a). The court joined several other district courts in holding that, based on the statutory language, a failure to mark at any point during the damages period eliminates the ability to recover pre-notice damages. The court recognized that this was a harsh result but stressed that the statutory language is clear. Moreover, as the Federal Circuit previously explained, entitlement to pre-suit damages based on constructive notice to the accused infringer is a benefit, not an affirmative right. And this was not a case where an entity made an unauthorized sale—plaintiff had licensed these third-party sales without requiring them to mark their products. Thus, because licensees had failed to mark at one point in time, plaintiff could not recover damages prior to providing actual notice of alleged infringement.

Turning to plaintiff’s pre-suit notice letter, the court held that the representative products and infringement allegations the plaintiff identified were sufficient to provide notice of actual infringement. Written without the benefit of discovery, the letter nonetheless identified the categories of accused products. Accordingly, plaintiff was entitled to seek damages as of the date of its letter.

Practice Tip: Because a failure to mark covered products at any point in time could cut off all pre-notice damages, it is critical that patent owners comply with the marking statute and require their licensees to comply at all times a covered product is sold. On the other hand, accused infringers facing years of damages should determine whether the patentee (or a licensee) sold any arguably covered, but unmarked products at any point during the damages period.

Lighting Defense Group, LLC v. Shanghai Sansi Electronic Engineering Company Limited, et al., 2-22-cv-01476 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2024)

Share This Insight

Previous Entries

IP Newsflash

August 11, 2025

In considering a motion to dismiss infringement claims for two related patents, the District of Massachusetts recently held that pre-suit knowledge of a “parent” patent, without more, is insufficient to establish pre-suit knowledge of the “child” patent for purposes of indirect and willful infringement.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

August 8, 2025

Following a jury verdict finding trade secret misappropriation, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted-in-part a plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction to prohibit defendants from using plaintiff’s trade secrets. The district court further required defendants to reassign to plaintiff patents and patent applications that disclosed or were derived from plaintiff’s trade secrets as part of its equitable relief.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

August 6, 2025

In ruling on a recent motion to strike, a judge in the Eastern District of Texas permitted a damages expert to rely on a damages theory based on defendant’s “avoided costs,” holding that this theory did not run afoul of the “entire market value rule.”

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

August 5, 2025

The Federal Circuit recently vacated a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board after concluding that the board’s analysis of licensing evidence offered as a secondary consideration of nonobviousness constituted legal error and was not supported by substantial evidence. According to the court, the board applied a more exacting and improperly heightened nexus standard than is required by law for license evidence.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

August 5, 2025

A Northern District of California judge recently granted a motion to reconsider his summary judgment ruling that defendant was barred from raising certain “device art” due to IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). In the original ruling, the judge adopted the broader rule that IPR estoppel applies to device art that is “materially identical” to patents or printed publications that petitioners raised, or could have raised, in an IPR. Following that ruling, however, the Federal Circuit issued its Ingenico decision adopting the narrower view that IPR estoppel applies only to “grounds” based on patents and printed publications and not to device-based grounds. Citing Ingenico as a “change of law,” defendant moved for reconsideration of the court’s ruling, and the court granted the motion.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

August 5, 2025

In a recent decision designated as Informative, the USPTO Director determined that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board abused its discretion by instituting two inter partes review proceedings challenging the same patent, based on petitions advancing different constructions of the same claim term. The Director expressed concerns that permitting multiple petitions based on alternative claim constructions effectively circumvents word count limitations, strains board resources, and undermines procedural efficiency.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

July 25, 2025

Earlier this year, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc. (Qualcomm II) raised questions about the extent to which petitioners can rely on applicant admitted prior art (“AAPA”) in inter partes review proceedings.  The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Shockwave Medical, Inc. v. Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. largely cabins the Qualcomm II decision to its particular facts and makes clear that AAPA can be used as evidence of background knowledge as part of an obviousness argument.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

July 11, 2025

The Federal Circuit recently reversed a PTAB determination on remand that a patent was obvious over applicant admitted prior art (“AAPA”) in combination with prior art patents, holding that expressly designating AAPA as a “basis” for a ground is improper under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). In doing so, the Court rejected the PTAB’s “blanket rule” that “AAPA used in combination with prior art patents or printed publications under § 311(b) is ipso facto not the basis or part of the basis of a ground.” Ultimately, while the case clarifies that expressly listing AAPA in an IPR ground is improper, the precise line between proper and improper uses of AAPA in other instances remains unclear.

...

Read More

© 2025 Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. All rights reserved. Attorney advertising. This document is distributed for informational use only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be used as such. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Akin is the practicing name of Akin Gump LLP, a New York limited liability partnership authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority under number 267321. A list of the partners is available for inspection at Eighth Floor, Ten Bishops Square, London E1 6EG. For more information about Akin Gump LLP, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP and other associated entities under which the Akin Gump network operates worldwide, please see our Legal Notices page.