A European Union approach to class-action litigation

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Multinational corporations encounter complex and dispositive legal frameworks that govern not only substantive rights but also procedural rules that dictate who may assert those rights and, importantly, on whose behalf.

Most businesses operating in the U.S. are, unfortunately, all too familiar with its class-action device, which is available in state and federal courts.

Indeed, the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing procedure in civil cases litigated in federal courts in the U.S., introduced the modern articulation of the procedural rule governing class actions: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. And while state courts have adopted their own individualized class-action procedures, they commonly look to federal law for guidance.

In the intervening five decades, class-action filings have increased exponentially in the U.S., buttressed by the potential for crushing aggregate monetary damages, class-wide injunctive relief and significant attorney fees. While the U.S. generally does not have loser-pay rules for attorney fees, successful class actions are one exception.

These cases are often filed by individuals such as consumers or employees challenging purported conduct on behalf of all others “similarly situated.” The rise in litigation has been met with judicial and legislative reformations in class-action procedure.

On the judicial side, federal courts have become increasingly vigilant in their efforts to ensure that plaintiffs strictly comply with the Rule 23’s certification requirements. As for legislation, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), which relaxed some of the requirements defendants must meet to access federal courts, perceived to be better venues for them in class-action lawsuits.

Nevertheless, enterprising plaintiffs’ lawyers and their counsel leverage the class-action device to put substantial pressure on businesses to consider settlement of claims, even where there are valid and even potentially dispositive defenses.

The defense costs can be significant, the potential exposure great, and the sensitivities and disruption to the business that accompany litigation of this magnitude considerable.

Across the Atlantic, collective-redress litigation has not yet taken hold to the same extent, at least in part because of the serious disparity among the processes and procedures available in the different European Union member states. But that may very soon be changing.


If implemented in its current form, there is a risk the EU would import only what many believe to be the most frustrating aspect of the U.S. class-action system: that often the true beneficiaries of the cases are the lawyers who file them.

The proposal has gained increased momentum, with consumer groups like the Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs endorsing it.

Further, on March 26, the whole EU Parliament, the Plenary, adopted its position of the proposal. See Representative Actions for the Protection of the Collective Interests of Consumers, available at https://bit.ly/2KRhPR8. Now that the elections have concluded, the Council of the European Union next will consider the proposal and Parliament’s Position.

ENHANCED CONSUMER PROTECTIONS SOUGHT

Since 1998, the EU has required its member states to make collective redress available through representative actions for injunctive relief brought by qualified entities designated by the member states, such as consumer organizations or independent
public bodies. This is pursuant to Directive 2009/22/EC, as amended, known as the Injunctions Directive.

However, no unionwide regime exists for other forms of collective remedy such as damages. For this reason, the European Commission has long regarded the Injunctions Directive as inadequate.

Although a number of member states, including, perhaps most notably, the U.K. and Netherlands, have their own established regimes for collective compensatory actions, there is a great divergence in the availability and nature of the regimes in each member state. In fact, some member states have no compensatory regimes at all (and, therefore, no class actions comparable to those in the U.S.).

The proposal, which was first issued in April 2018 and passed by the European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee in December and by the EU Plenary (in the Parliament’s Position) in March seeks to “modernise and replace” the Injunctions Directive with a regime that will enhance the protection afforded to consumers under EU law.

While the legislation awaits review and approval by the European Council, some form of the new directive is likely to be codified as law within the EU.

To that end, the collective action regimes already available in individual member states will not be replaced. Instead, the legislation provides an expanded framework for specific representative actions that would be implemented at the member-state level so that consumers in all member states will benefit from at least one similar mechanism unionwide.

Under the proposal, this unionwide framework would:

• Enable compensatory redress by empowering “qualified entities” to bring representative actions seeking different types of measures as appropriate, depending on the circumstances of the case.” “These include interim or definitive measures to stop and prohibit a trader’s practice, if it is considered an infringement of the law, and measures eliminating the continuing effects of the infringement.” “The latter could include redress orders and declaratory decisions establishing the trader’s liability toward the consumers harmed by the infringements.”

• Expand the sectoral scope of the regime “to cover other horizontal and sector-specific EU instruments relevant for the protection of collective interests of consumers in different economic sectors such as financial services, energy, telecommunications, health and the environment.”

• “Build on the approach of the current Injunctions Directive” regarding “qualified entities’ designated by the member states to bring representative actions.” “These qualified entities will have to satisfy minimum reputational criteria (they must be properly established, not for profit and have a legitimate interest in ensuring compliance with EU law).” In addition, “[f]or compensatory collective redress actions, qualified entities would also be required to disclose to the courts or administrative authorities their financial capacity and the origin of their funds supporting the action.” And “courts and administrative authorities will be empowered to assess the arrangements for third party funding.”

• Require “member states to ensure ‘due expediency’ of procedures and to avoid procedural costs becoming a financial obstacle to bringing representative actions.” Under the proposal, this would be achieved by ensuring consumers are “adequately informed of the outcome of representative actions and how they will benefit from them.” The proposal also “promotes collective out-of-court settlements, subject to court or administrative authority scrutiny.” Also, “[f]inal decisions of a court or authority establishing that a trader has infringed the law will be irrefutable evidence in redress actions (within the same member state) or a rebuttable presumption that the infringement has occurred (for cases brought in another member state).”

• The proposal and the Parliament’s Position are largely overlapping, although not identical. The proposal explains that, “[a]s a rule, qualified entities should be entitled to bring representative actions seeking a redress order, which obligates the trader to provide for, inter alia, compensation, repair, replacement, price reduction, contract termination or reimbursement of the price paid, as appropriate.” Parliament’s Position contains similar wording.

However, the proposal also acknowledges that it will be “necessary to provide flexibility to the member states in cases where the quantification of the harm of the consumers concerned by the representative action is complex due to the characteristics of their individual harm.”

In such cases, under the proposal, but not the Parliament’s Position, member states may be entitled to “empower courts or administrative authorities to decide whether to issue, instead of a redress order, a declaratory decision regarding the liability of the trader toward the consumers harmed by an infringement of EU law, which may be directly relied upon in subsequent redress actions.”

Notably, however, the proposal states that such “flexibility” would be inappropriate in so-called “low-value cases’ where a number of consumers have suffered such a small amount
of loss that it would be disproportionate or impracticable to
distribute the redress back to the consumers.” In these cases,
redress would be “directed to a public purpose to serve the
collective interests of consumers.” The Parliament’s Position
omits these directives.

LOOKING AHEAD

While the proposal and the Parliament’s Position import from
the U.S. the availability of class actions seeking monetary
damages, it is not yet clear whether any of the associated
procedural safeguards found in Rule 23 will be imported too,
either by the EU in any final directive, or in national legislation
when implemented by each member state.

Certainly, the proposal and the Parliament’s Position do not
appear to consider many of the lessons that could be learned
from class actions in the U.S.

Specifically, Rule 23 requires plaintiffs to establish that their
actions are properly adjudicated as class actions before any
questions regarding class-wide liability are resolved.

In every putative class action seeking monetary relief,
Rule 23(a)(1)-(4) requires plaintiffs to establish, among other
things: (1) a numerous class that makes joinder impracticable;
(2) “questions of law or fact common to the class;” (3) that the
plaintiff’s claims are “typical” of the class claims; and (4) that
the plaintiff will “fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.”

In addition, under Rule 23(b)(3) the majority of putative
class actions seeking monetary relief must also show
“(1) that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and (2) that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.”

Also, counsel in U.S. class actions must seek appointment
from the court, which must approve any payment of attorney
fees under Rule 23(g)-(h).

Finally, class-action settlements in federal courts in the U.S.
include robust notice requirements that provide members
of any putative class with rights to opt out of the proceedings
and, where a class action is settled, class members are
permitted an opportunity to lodge objections to the
agreement. At every step, courts are required to vigorously
enforce these requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) and Rule 23(e).

The EU, by contrast, is not considering such requirements
(at least not expressly). Instead, the proposal claims that
the “qualified entity” requirement “is a strong safeguard
against frivolous actions.” The Parliament’s Position includes
no additional protections. And, as many commentators
have cautioned, the “qualified entity” requirement, like

its predecessor, may do little more than serve a pro forma
purpose. They say the requirement will not meaningfully
deter, much less prevent, attempts to abuse the collective
action procedure.

Similarly, the proposal says little about when consumers will
need to be alerted to or involved in actions that might concern
them. It does specify, however, that qualified entities would
be able to seek injunctions without having “to obtain the
mandate of the individual consumers concerned or provide
proof of actual loss or damage on the part of the consumers
concerned or of intention or negligence on the part of the
trader.” This applies also where “consumers have suffered
a small amount of loss and it would be disproportionate
to distribute the redress to them,” i.e., “low-value cases.”

Member states would be required under Article 6 to “ensure
that the mandate of the individual consumers concerned is
not required.” But the Parliament’s Position deletes Article 6.

Accordinly, unlike the strict requirements for notice and
right to opt out of class actions in the U.S., consumers in the
EU may in some instances (and depending on how any
directive is ultimately implemented in each member state)
be represented by “qualified entities” regardless of the
consumers’ knowledge or consent to the action, and possibly
without any proof of damage.

Finally, attorney fees are not meaningfully addressed.
There are some restrictions proposed regarding third-party
funding, and qualified entities must be “not for profit;” but
it is not clear whether this operating status would have an
impact on the ability of these entities to seek and recover
significant fees.

As for costs, the proposal would not impact national rules
regarding cost allocation, while the Parliament’s Position
would shift costs onto the unsuccessful party.

If implemented in its current form, there is a risk the EU would
import only what many believe to be the most frustrating aspect of the U.S. class-action system: that often the true
beneficiaries of the cases are the lawyers who file them. This
is particularly notable because references to an excessive
class-action-litigation environment in the U.S. were made
while in committee.

While the legislation awaits review and approval by the
European Council, some form of the new directive is likely to
be codified as law within the EU. Businesses would be wise to
stay abreast of developments, and to amendments expected
elsewhere in the EU, as member states continue to grapple
with these important issues.

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