Finding of Exceptionality Leaves Unsuccessful Infringement Plaintiff Liable for Over $50 Million in Attorney Fees and Costs

Mar 10, 2017

Reading Time : 3 min

The consolidated action arose from 14 different lawsuits that Rembrandt filed between 2005 and 2007 against many of America’s biggest cable companies, including Time Warner, Comcast and Cablevision. Rembrandt accused the cable companies of infringing nine digital broadcasting and cable transmission patents that Rembrandt, a “non-practicing entity,” had acquired from the patents’ original owner. The cases were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, along with a 15th lawsuit that another cable company had filed against Rembrandt.

Following the consolidation, the parties engaged in extensive discovery spanning almost two years. The parties exchanged more than 15 million documents, and each side had 650 hours of deposition time. Rembrandt alone deposed 75 witnesses. Rembrandt also served reports from five different experts.

Rembrandt ultimately agreed to execute covenants-not-to-sue covering all of the asserted patents, and the court dismissed the case. The defendants then asked the court to find the case exceptional and award them their attorney fees and costs.

On August 20, 2015, U.S. District Judge Gregory M. Sleet granted the defendants’ request. Judge Sleet began his analysis by noting the Supreme Court’s recent observation (in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.) that, for purposes of § 285, “an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigation position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” As Judge Sleet further explained, “Octane Fitness also clarified that parties seeking fees under § 285 need only establish their entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Applying these standards, Judge Sleet held that a finding of exceptionality against Rembrandt was warranted for three reasons.

First, Judge Sleet found that Rembrandt had “improperly compensated its fact witnesses, in violation of ethical rules of conduct.” Specifically, the evidence showed that Rembrandt had guaranteed three of its most important witnesses 3-5 percent contingent interests in the outcome of the litigation. The defendants argued that these arrangements incentivized the witnesses to assist Rembrandt, regardless of the actual facts, including by concealing and destroying evidence. In response, Rembrandt claimed that it merely had retained those witnesses as consultants, since they had exceptional knowledge of the relevant patent portfolio, and that it never paid any witness to give false testimony or destroy documents. Agreeing with the defendants, Judge Sleet found that “the fee structure for Rembrandt’s fact witnesses was unreasonable and improperly linked to the outcome of the case, giving rise to a considerable risk of tainted testimony.”

Second, Judge Sleet concluded that Rembrandt had engaged in—or at least had failed to prevent—widespread document spoliation throughout the litigation, thereby prejudicing the defendants’ right to conduct full discovery. The evidence indicated that various key witnesses and companies with relevant knowledge and materials had destroyed or discarded thousands of boxes of discoverable records. Judge Sleet found that, even though Rembrandt itself may not have destroyed any documents, it had control over those who did, and that Rembrandt anticipated “forthcoming litigation such that it had a duty to preserve or instruct others to retain certain documents.”

Third, Judge Sleet held that two of the asserted patents in the case had been fraudulently revived prior to the litigation and thus were unenforceable, which Rembrandt either knew or should have known when it filed suit. The two patents had expired after the original patent holder failed to pay the requisite maintenance fees. The original owner revived the patents before selling them to Rembrandt. Judge Sleet concluded that the delayed maintenance payments were deliberate and that the revival of the patents was therefore fraudulent. In turn, Judge Sleet ruled that Rembrandt, although it had no direct dealings with the PTO concerning the two patents, nevertheless “had sufficient knowledge to learn of the fraud” due to its relationship with the original patent holder and the employees who engaged in the inequitable conduct.

After Judge Sleet held that Rembrandt’s litigation conduct warranted a finding of exceptionality, the defendants submitted evidence substantiating their claimed attorney fees and expenses, which totaled more than $51 million. On March 2, 2017, Judge Sleet issued an order rejecting Rembrandt’s various objections to the defendants’ evidence and requiring Rembrandt to pay the requested fees and costs, plus post judgment interest for every day it fails to do so.

In re: Rembrandt Technologies, Patent Litigation, No. 07-mdl-1848 (GMS) (D. Del. Mar. 2, 2017).

Share This Insight

Previous Entries

IP Newsflash

August 11, 2025

In considering a motion to dismiss infringement claims for two related patents, the District of Massachusetts recently held that pre-suit knowledge of a “parent” patent, without more, is insufficient to establish pre-suit knowledge of the “child” patent for purposes of indirect and willful infringement.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

August 8, 2025

Following a jury verdict finding trade secret misappropriation, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted-in-part a plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction to prohibit defendants from using plaintiff’s trade secrets. The district court further required defendants to reassign to plaintiff patents and patent applications that disclosed or were derived from plaintiff’s trade secrets as part of its equitable relief.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

August 6, 2025

In ruling on a recent motion to strike, a judge in the Eastern District of Texas permitted a damages expert to rely on a damages theory based on defendant’s “avoided costs,” holding that this theory did not run afoul of the “entire market value rule.”

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

August 5, 2025

The Federal Circuit recently vacated a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board after concluding that the board’s analysis of licensing evidence offered as a secondary consideration of nonobviousness constituted legal error and was not supported by substantial evidence. According to the court, the board applied a more exacting and improperly heightened nexus standard than is required by law for license evidence.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

August 5, 2025

A Northern District of California judge recently granted a motion to reconsider his summary judgment ruling that defendant was barred from raising certain “device art” due to IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). In the original ruling, the judge adopted the broader rule that IPR estoppel applies to device art that is “materially identical” to patents or printed publications that petitioners raised, or could have raised, in an IPR. Following that ruling, however, the Federal Circuit issued its Ingenico decision adopting the narrower view that IPR estoppel applies only to “grounds” based on patents and printed publications and not to device-based grounds. Citing Ingenico as a “change of law,” defendant moved for reconsideration of the court’s ruling, and the court granted the motion.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

August 5, 2025

In a recent decision designated as Informative, the USPTO Director determined that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board abused its discretion by instituting two inter partes review proceedings challenging the same patent, based on petitions advancing different constructions of the same claim term. The Director expressed concerns that permitting multiple petitions based on alternative claim constructions effectively circumvents word count limitations, strains board resources, and undermines procedural efficiency.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

July 25, 2025

Earlier this year, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc. (Qualcomm II) raised questions about the extent to which petitioners can rely on applicant admitted prior art (“AAPA”) in inter partes review proceedings.  The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Shockwave Medical, Inc. v. Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. largely cabins the Qualcomm II decision to its particular facts and makes clear that AAPA can be used as evidence of background knowledge as part of an obviousness argument.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

July 11, 2025

The Federal Circuit recently reversed a PTAB determination on remand that a patent was obvious over applicant admitted prior art (“AAPA”) in combination with prior art patents, holding that expressly designating AAPA as a “basis” for a ground is improper under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). In doing so, the Court rejected the PTAB’s “blanket rule” that “AAPA used in combination with prior art patents or printed publications under § 311(b) is ipso facto not the basis or part of the basis of a ground.” Ultimately, while the case clarifies that expressly listing AAPA in an IPR ground is improper, the precise line between proper and improper uses of AAPA in other instances remains unclear.

...

Read More

© 2025 Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. All rights reserved. Attorney advertising. This document is distributed for informational use only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be used as such. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Akin is the practicing name of Akin Gump LLP, a New York limited liability partnership authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority under number 267321. A list of the partners is available for inspection at Eighth Floor, Ten Bishops Square, London E1 6EG. For more information about Akin Gump LLP, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP and other associated entities under which the Akin Gump network operates worldwide, please see our Legal Notices page.