PTAB Institutes IPR Despite Petitioner’s Prior Invalidity Challenge in Declaratory Judgment Action, Citing “Unambiguous Language” of 35 U.S.C. § 315

Apr 11, 2018

Reading Time : 2 min

IPRs related to an “Infringer’s Civil Action” are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 315(a). Under § 315(a)(1), “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner or real party in interest filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.”  But § 315(a)(3) clarifies that “[a] counterclaim challenging the validity of a claim of a patent does not constitute a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent for purposes of this subsection.”  In a typical scenario, the Board must deny institution when a petitioner has filed an earlier declaratory judgment action seeking invalidity. Here, however, Canfield did not seek an invalidity declaration until its “Answer and Counterclaim” in reply to Melanoscan’s infringement counterclaim. The question for the Board, therefore, was whether this invalidity challenge was truly a “counterclaim” under § 315(a)(3), or whether it was a “civil action” under § 315(a)(1). The Board held that it was a counterclaim, and the Petition was not barred.

In reaching this conclusion, the Board relied on the express language of the statute. In particular, the Board explained that “the language of 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(3) . . . uses the term ‘counterclaim’” and “affirmatively states that a ‘counterclaim’ for invalidity filed by an accused infringer does not constitute the filing of a civil action asserting invalidity.”  And because the statute does not distinguish “counterclaims-in-reply”—i.e., counterclaims by plaintiffs—from “ordinary” counterclaims, the Board rejected Melanoscan’s argument that § 315(a)(3) relates only to “a claim made by a defendant against a plaintiff.”

The Board also rejected Melanoscan’s argument that § 315(a)(3) relates only to an “accused infringer who has been sued and is asserting invalidity in a counterclaim” because all sub-parts under § 315(a) “relate to, by explicit language, ‘[i]nfringer’s civil action.’”  The Board cited the structure of the statute, which explicitly addresses “[p]atent owner’s action” in § 315(b) for further support. In sum, the Board concluded that “counterclaim” in § 315(a)(3) relates to counterclaims in actions brought by the infringer, as was the case here.

Before proceeding to the merits, the Board acknowledged that, as a policy matter, “interpreting the statute in this manner . . . effectively allow[s] a Petitioner to initiate a civil action concerning a patent, but also later file a petition seeking inter partes review, frustrating one of the goals of these proceedings as being an alternate to district court proceedings.”  Nonetheless, “Congress has spoken,” and these “policy considerations do not override the unambiguous statutory language.”

Canfield Scientific, Inc. v. Melanoscan, LLC, IPR2017-02125, Paper No. 15 (PTAB Mar. 30, 2018)

Share This Insight

Previous Entries

IP Newsflash

November 14, 2025

The Ninth Circuit recently reversed a district court’s decision to strike a plaintiff’s trade secret claims under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) at the discovery stage. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit made clear that under the DTSA, whether a party defined their trade secret with sufficient particularity is a question of fact that generally does not lend itself to resolution in the absence of at least some discovery. This ruling contrasts with the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), which requires a party to define their trade secrets with reasonable particularity before commencing discovery.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

November 11, 2025

The Federal Circuit recently vacated a summary judgment ruling of invalidity, holding that the district court erred in applying preclusive effect to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s unpatentability findings regarding other claims in the same patent. In doing so, the Federal Circuit reiterated that issue preclusion does not apply where the prior factual determinations were made under a lower standard of proof.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

November 3, 2025

The Federal Circuit recently clarified the requirement for work disclosed in a reference to qualify as “by another” under pre-AIA Sections 102(a) and (e), holding that there must be complete inventive identity between the information disclosed in the asserted reference and the inventors named on the relevant patent. 

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

October 31, 2025

The District Court for the Northern District of California recently granted a defendant’s motion to bifurcate, ordering that issues related to PGR estoppel should be decided in a bench trial, while the remaining issues in the case should proceed to a jury trial.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

October 31, 2025

The Northern District of Iowa recently held that a defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment of invalidity was barred after the PTAB issued final written decisions, regardless of when the motion was filed. The defendant filed its motion before the final written decisions were issued, but the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the timing of the motion insulated it from estoppel.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

October 1, 2025

In a recent final written decision, the PTAB determined that a reference patent was not prior art, despite the petitioner’s post‑filing attempt to correct its petition. While the petitioner argued that it intended to rely on the patent application’s earlier date of publication, both the corrected petition and the expert declaration continued to reference the issued patent rather than the published application.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

September 30, 2025

The USPTO Director recently granted a petitioner’s request for rehearing of the decision discretionarily denying institution of inter partes review, ultimately vacating the original decision, and referring the petition to the board for an institution decision.

...

Read More

IP Newsflash

September 25, 2025

In considering claims to a method of reducing cardiovascular events, the Federal Circuit held that the term a “clinically proven effective” amount did not render the claims patentable over the prior art. Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that the “clinically proven effective” amount, whether limiting or not, could not be used to distinguish the prior art because the claims also specified the exact amount of the drugs to be administered in the method. The Federal Circuit also rejected patentee’s evidence of unexpected results because that evidence was tied solely to the “clinically proven effective” limitation.

...

Read More

© 2025 Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. All rights reserved. Attorney advertising. This document is distributed for informational use only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be used as such. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Akin is the practicing name of Akin Gump LLP, a New York limited liability partnership authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority under number 267321. A list of the partners is available for inspection at Eighth Floor, Ten Bishops Square, London E1 6EG. For more information about Akin Gump LLP, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP and other associated entities under which the Akin Gump network operates worldwide, please see our Legal Notices page.