DOJ’s Criminal Division Turns Page on White Collar Crime—But Keeps One Foot in the Past

Key Takeaways

• New and old priorities. The Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has outlined a new “white-collar enforcement plan” with 10 “high-impact” areas for white collar enforcement that includes new priorities—such as procurement fraud and trade and customs fraud, including tariff evasion—as well as traditional ones, such as violations of the Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA) and U.S. sanctions laws.
• Whistleblower program expansion. Tips tied to new Criminal Division priorities—including immigration and national security-related crimes—are now eligible for financial reward.
• Revised self-disclosure policy. DOJ’s updated Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) offers more detailed incentives for voluntary self-reporting, but DOJ continues to retain enormous discretion to consider “aggravating circumstances.”
• Narrowed use of monitors. A new Memorandum on Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division Matters (“Monitor Selection Memo”) tightens when and how corporate monitors will be appointed and overseen.
• Push for faster investigations. DOJ directs prosecutors to investigate more quickly, while acknowledging the practical difficulties of doing so in many instances.
• Incremental policy changes. Despite promises of change, updated DOJ policies largely follow longstanding enforcement practices.

DOJ’s White Collar Enforcement Priorities

On May 12, 2025, the DOJ announced a new “white-collar enforcement plan” identifying new corporate enforcement priorities and aiming to promote greater focus, fairness and efficiency in prosecuting corporate misconduct. In a memorandum titled “Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime” (the “Criminal Division Memo”), DOJ identified 10 enforcement priorities and announced several policy updates that refine existing tools rather than fundamentally alter the white collar enforcement landscape.

While DOJ’s messaging suggests a strategic reset, the actual reforms—particularly updates to its CEP and a new Monitor Selection Memo—closely align with prior guidance. The DOJ’s Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program also continues, although it was expanded to accept tips related to the administration’s new priority areas. The result is a clarified but familiar framework for resolving corporate investigations, with stronger incentives for voluntary cooperation and stricter guardrails around monitorships.

Top Corporate Enforcement Priorities

The Criminal Division Memo outlines 10 “high-impact” areas for white collar enforcement, aligning closely with the Trump administration’s focus on fraud, waste and abuse, national security and criminal cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs).

As expected, the DOJ emphasized:

• Procurement, health care and federal program fraud.
• Trade and customs fraud, including tariff evasion.
• Controlled Substances Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act violations, particularly related to fentanyl or opioids.
• Support to foreign terrorist organizations, including designated cartels and TCOs.
• Sanctions violations or facilitating financial transactions involving cartels, TCOs, hostile nation-states and/or foreign terrorist organizations.

Some inclusions and exclusions stand out:

• Bribery and associated money laundering that undermine U.S. national interests, national security or business competitiveness, or that “enrich corrupt foreign officials” are named as priorities—despite the FCPA “pause” announced in February. See our recent client alerts regarding shifts in FCPA enforcement here and here.
• Notably, immigration-related crimes were omitted from the top enforcement priorities list, despite the administration’s focus on border crimes. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the administration will continue to prioritize immigration matters, even though it may do so primarily within local U.S. Attorney’s offices, rather than via Main Justice.
• There is no explicit mention of export controls violations, which are typically handled by the National Security Division, but they appear to remain a priority alongside sanctions violations. Of note, the U.S. Commerce Secretary recently forecasted a “dramatic increase” in enforcement actions against companies that violate U.S. export controls. Export control violations may also have been contemplated within the “trade and customs fraud” priority.
• Two entries appear to target China-linked activity: (i) fraud through variable interest entities (VIEs), which are described as “typically Chinese-affiliated companies listed on U.S. exchanges,” and (ii) complex money laundering operations, “including Chinese Money Laundering Organizations,” that are involved in laundering funds related to the illegal drug trade.

Expanded Whistleblower Incentives

The DOJ also announced an expansion in scope of the DOJ Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program (the “Pilot Program”). Originally launched in August 2024 for a three-year term, the Pilot Program provides for monetary rewards to whistleblowers who provide original, truthful information about corporate criminal misconduct relating to certain designated subject areas that ultimately leads to civil or criminal forfeiture of more than $1 million. The scope of the Pilot Program was expanded to include whistleblower tips linked to corporate violations relating to:

1. Procurement fraud.
2. Trade, tariff or customs fraud.
3. Federal immigration law.
4. National security-related crimes such as sanctions offenses, material support of terrorism or money laundering, narcotics and other crimes related to cartels or TCOs.

This expansion indicates that the DOJ recognizes whistleblower incentives as a powerful tool to generate investigative leads for some of its highest priorities and intends to keep the Pilot Program in place for the present time.

Corporate Enforcement Policy Revisions

The DOJ has also updated its CEP in an apparent effort to provide more clarity and consistency in outcomes to self-reporting companies. The CEP now provides additional incentives for companies to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct and increases transparency about the DOJ’s decision making in determining an appropriate corporate resolution. Key changes include:

• Clearer declination standards. Companies that (1) voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, (2) fully cooperate with the Criminal Division’s investigation, (3) timely and appropriately remediate the misconduct and (4) present no aggravating factors related to the nature and seriousness of the offense, egregiousness or pervasiveness of misconduct within the company, severity of harm caused by the misconduct or criminal resolutions of similar misconduct within the last five years, will receive a declination—not just a “presumption of a declination.”
• Declination where aggravating factors exist. Even with aggravating factors, the DOJ may decline prosecution if the company’s response merits it. This update removes a set of rigid thresholds that a company previously needed to meet in order to receive a declination in the presence of one or more aggravating factors.
• More certainty for “near misses.” For a company that fully cooperates and remediates but does not qualify for a declination because (1) it self-reported in good faith but does not qualify as a “voluntary self-disclosure” or (2) aggravating factors are present that warrant a criminal resolution, the DOJ will resolve the matter through a Non-Prosecution Agreement (except in the presence of “particularly egregious or multiple aggravating circumstances”) with a term length of fewer than three years, not require a compliance monitor and provide a reduction of 75% off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) fine range.
• Low-end fine range presumption. Companies that cooperate and remediate—but do not qualify for a declination or a “near miss” resolution—can still receive up to a 50% reduction from the USSG fine range, and will enjoy a presumption that any reduction will be taken from the low end of the range.

While these refinements appear to offer more certainty to companies deciding whether to self-disclose or negotiate a resolution with the DOJ, it remains difficult to predict how DOJ will apply loosely defined terms such as “aggravating circumstances.” DOJ appears to have preserved its broad discretion to assess such circumstances on a case-by-case basis, even though doing so limits the certainty available to companies weighing whether to self-disclose.

Monitor Selection Memo

The Monitor Selection Memo revises and supersedes prior Criminal Division Guidance regarding the selection of monitors. It restructures the analysis of whether a monitorship is necessary, and appears to significantly narrow the circumstances in which a monitor will be imposed, including by requiring prosecutors to evaluate the benefits a monitor would present beyond the corporate compliance commitments included in all Criminal Division corporate resolutions, and directing prosecutors to evaluate not just the risk of recidivism but whether the risk of recurring misconduct could “significantly impact U.S. interests.” Prosecutors must also consider the efficacy of the company’s compliance program and whether its voluntary engagement of third parties, such as consultants, auditors and other experts, obviates the need for a monitor.

Where a monitor is warranted, prosecutors must ensure that the costs imposed by the monitor remain proportionate to the severity of the underlying misconduct, as well as the company’s size, risk profile and profits. In addition, the Monitor Selection Memo imposes new requirements regarding the hourly and total fees that a monitor may charge, and directs that the government, company and monitor should meet at least biannually “to mitigate against monitor overreach” and allow for regular dialogue between the parties. The memo also makes clear that a company’s decision not to implement a monitor’s recommendation should not necessarily be seen as a compliance or remediation failure.

Emphasis on Speed and Efficiency

In addition to these policy revisions, the Criminal Division Memo also introduces new measures to expedite white collar investigations and corporate resolutions:

• Corporate resolutions with companies that cooperate with their investigation and remediate misconduct should be no longer than three years (except in “exceedingly rare cases”).
• Prosecutors are instructed to “move expeditiously to investigate cases and make charging decisions” given the costs that long-running investigations can impose on companies.
• DOJ senior management is committing to tracking investigations across the Criminal Division to ensure they are “swiftly concluded.”

These moves reflect long-standing DOJ goals and will surely be welcomed by companies seeking faster closure and more predictable outcomes. At the same time, the Criminal Division Memo acknowledges the practical challenges of swiftly concluding white collar investigations, noting that “[w]hite-collar schemes are complex and often cross borders” and “[a]s a result, these schemes take substantial time and effort to unravel.” Given these realities, it remains unclear whether the DOJ’s stated commitment to speeding up white collar investigations will translate into meaningful improvements in efficiency in practice.

Bottom Line

DOJ’s latest policy changes reinforce its commitment to streamlining white collar enforcement while reaffirming many past practices. Companies considering self-disclosure or facing DOJ scrutiny should carefully monitor the evolving nuances of DOJ’s priority areas, policy incentives and monitor program. Despite some changes, the main elements of the DOJ white collar playbook appear to remain largely intact.