New DIFC Court Law – The Courts’ Enforcement and Supportive Jurisdiction One Year On

Executive Summary

One year has passed since Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 (New Court Law) recalibrated the jurisdiction and powers of the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts. This article considers how the New Court Law has worked in practice, and identifies the trends and lessons learned.

During its first year of operation, three key themes have emerged in connection with the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction to enforce/support foreign arbitral and litigation proceedings:

1. The DIFC Courts have confirmed that they have a free-standing jurisdiction to grant worldwide freezing orders (WFOs), in support of foreign litigation, even where neither the dispute nor the assets have a direct connection with the DIFC. However, recent first instance case law suggests the approach may be more restrictive for WFOs in support of non-DIFC-seated arbitrations (as opposed to foreign litigation). That said, we expect the DIFC Court of Appeal is likely to extend this jurisdiction to both litigation and arbitration when this issue comes before it.
2. Anti‑suit injunctions (ASIs)¹ may be granted by the DIFC Courts to restrain a breach of an arbitration agreement, but only where the DIFC Courts have jurisdiction under the New Court Law. In practice, this means that there is limited scope for obtaining an ASI from the DIFC Courts to prevent parallel proceedings brought in contravention of a non-DIFC-seated arbitration agreement.
3. While the New Court Law continues to permit the DIFC Courts to be used as a conduit² to recognise and enforce foreign judgments and awards in onshore Dubai,³ recent decisions highlight practical and procedural limits. In particular, where related proceedings are on foot in onshore Dubai in connection with a Dubai-seated arbitration, there is a risk that the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal (CJT) will find that the Dubai Courts have jurisdiction to the exclusion of the DIFC Courts.

Overall, the first year of the New Court Law points to a more structured and predictable enforcement framework in the DIFC. At the same time, it underlines the importance of early strategic planning, including careful consideration of forum selection and the potential interaction between the DIFC and onshore Dubai Courts.

Worldwide Freezing Orders

Foreign Litigation Proceedings

Prior to the New Court Law, the DIFC Court of Appeal confirmed in Carmon⁴ that the DIFC Courts had free-standing jurisdiction to grant WFOs in support of foreign court proceedings, irrespective of whether there was a separate jurisdictional nexus to the DIFC.⁵ However, following the introduction of the New Court Law, the DIFC Court of First Instance (CFI) twice rejected applications for WFOs in support of foreign court proceedings. These decisions suggested a regression by the DIFC Courts of its enforcement jurisdiction.

Those concerns have now been addressed with both CFI decisions overturned by the DIFC Court of Appeal.⁶ In Trafigura, the Court of Appeal held that Article 15(4) of the New Court Law provided the DIFC Courts with jurisdiction to grant interim measures, including WFOs, where the relevant foreign litigation proceedings could result in a judgment capable of recognition and enforcement in the DIFC Courts. Notably, the Court did not require a separate jurisdictional nexus or that the targeted assets be located in the DIFC (although these matters would be relevant to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction in granting the relief requested).⁷ The result is that the DIFC is once again aligned with the widely accepted principles of comity and international common law, described by the Privy Council in Broad Idea when establishing the ‘enforcement principle.’⁸

This approach has since been followed in Techteryx,⁹ where the DIFC Digital Economy Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction to grant a WFO in aid of foreign litigation proceedings so long as the judgment in those proceedings was potentially enforceable in the DIFC. This notion of ‘potential enforcement’ is critical. The Court expressly doubted that Article 15(4) permitted the DIFC Courts to act as “universal policeman where any party to proceedings anywhere in the world can seek an order restraining a counterparty from dealing with its assets where there is no other role for the DIFC Courts.”¹⁰ An open question and one that will be developed in future cases is precisely what it means for a foreign judgment to be ‘potentially enforceable.’ For example, is it enough that the DIFC Courts would likely recognise and enforce the judgment at common law, giving it res judicata effect? Or is something more required — for example, must it be likely that the DIFC Courts could exercise a power under RDC Parts 45 to 50?

The recent, as yet unpublished, decision of the CFI in ENF‑271/2025, suggests that the DIFC Courts will also grant WFOs in support of enforcement of final orders in foreign proceedings (and, of course, there should be no reason in principle why it would not do so). In this case, the DIFC Court granted both an Enforcement Order and a Receivership Order in connection with an English Court judgment, despite the fact that no relevant assets were located in the DIFC (they were instead in onshore Dubai). As well as following the above case law and extending its scope to final enforcement orders, this judgment also confirms the DIFC Courts’ continued ability under the New Court Law to act as a conduit jurisdiction, whereby foreign judgments can be recognised with a view to enforcement onshore.

Foreign Arbitral Proceedings

The position is less settled in relation to foreign‑seated arbitrations. As Article 15(4) equally applies to non-DIFC-seated arbitral proceedings, it may have been expected that the DIFC Courts would have been prepared to grant a WFO in respect of a foreign‑seated arbitration. However, the recent decision in Orabelle¹¹ saw the CFI dismiss an urgent ex parte application seeking a WFO and worldwide asset disclosure in support of a prospective Paris‑seated arbitration (which had not yet been commenced). The Court was not satisfied that it had sufficient jurisdiction to grant the WFO where no asset was identified in the DIFC.¹² This was a surprising decision, providing an interpretation of Article 15(4) at odds with the reasoning given in Carmon,¹³ and the approach reflected in Trafigura and Techteryx. It is also arguable that this decision sits uneasily within the statutory framework of the New Court Law¹⁴ and the DIFC Arbitration Law.¹⁵ It seems likely that the Court of Appeal would adopt a different approach, and utilise the same interpretation of Article 15(4) for foreign arbitration proceedings as foreign court proceedings. However, we await judicial confirmation on this point.

Notably, Orabelle also places the apparent position of the DIFC Courts in conflict with that of the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) Courts, which has confirmed its jurisdiction to grant a WFO in support of foreign arbitration proceedings, even where neither the parties nor the targeted assets are located in the ADGM.¹⁶ Ironically, in making this decision, the ADGM Courts expressed a desire to ensure consistency with the DIFC Courts and its ruling in Carmon.

Anti-Suit Injunctions

The past year has also clarified the DIFC Courts’ approach to ASIs. As under English law, the DIFC Courts can grant ASIs to restrain competing proceedings where such proceedings are (i) brought in conflict with an arbitration or jurisdiction agreement, or (ii) where those proceedings are vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable.¹⁷

Recent case law confirms that the DIFC Courts are prepared to grant ASIs where there is a clear jurisdictional link to the DIFC, including to protect a DIFC-seated arbitration from parallel proceedings commenced in the onshore United Arab Emirates (UAE) courts in breach of a valid arbitration agreement.¹⁸ In these circumstances, the DIFC Courts have demonstrated a willingness to utilise their jurisdiction and intervene decisively to uphold party autonomy and agreed dispute‑resolution mechanisms.

However, a clear boundary has been drawn in the recent case of Oran.¹⁹ Proceedings had been commenced by the respondent in a foreign court in an apparent breach of an arbitration agreement with an onshore Dubai seat. The DIFC Courts refused an application for an ASI, finding that it did not have free-standing jurisdiction to grant an ASI, and it did not otherwise have jurisdiction over the case as the arbitration agreement specified an onshore Dubai seat, and there was no other connection to the DIFC. The Court emphasised that the mere fact that the Court had a statutory power to grant an ASI was not sufficient; power is not the same as jurisdiction.

There has therefore been a divergence between the Court’s approach to enforcement orders, such as a WFO, and other interim relief which cannot be characterised as an enforcement measure, such as an ASI. For the former, the Court has a free-standing jurisdiction; for the latter, a separate jurisdictional gateway under the New Court Law must be established (for example, the relevant arbitral proceedings must be seated in the DIFC, involve a DIFC body or entity, or relate to obligations sufficiently connected to the DIFC).²⁰

Onshore Dubai Proceedings and the CJT

Efforts to obtain freezing orders or other enforcement-related actions from the DIFC Courts in support of onshore Dubai-seated arbitrations could be hindered where there are parallel proceedings in onshore Dubai. In these circumstances, the CJT is empowered to determine which court is the competent forum and prevent proceedings in the non-preferred forum.²¹

In a case recently before the CJT,²² an award had been issued in an arbitration seated in onshore Dubai, and there were parallel proceedings for: (1) recognition and enforcement, and the granting of a WFO in the DIFC Courts; and (2) annulment in the onshore Dubai Courts. The CJT found that the proceedings were conflicting and could not proceed simultaneously, and ordered that the DIFC Court proceedings be suspended for lack of jurisdiction. In preferring the Dubai Courts, the CJT relied on the fact that there was no nexus to the DIFC, and the onshore Dubai Courts were the supervisory courts of the seat. The CJT decision is at odds with the DIFC Court’s broad enforcement jurisdiction, and the position under the New York Convention that enforcement proceedings can continue while annulment proceedings are pending.

While this is just one decision, parties must be aware of the risk of CJT intervention when taking any steps in the DIFC Court connected to the enforcement of a Dubai-seated arbitration. It also raises the possibility that respondents to DIFC Court enforcement proceedings may adopt guerrilla tactics and attempt to utilise the CJT mechanism in an effort to obtain a stay of the DIFC proceedings, acting as a tactical brake.

However, it is important to place this risk in its proper context. Unlike applications made to the CJT’s predecessor, the Joint Judicial Committee (JJC), there is no automatic stay when a matter is referred to the CJT; instead the CJT has discretion to stay any relevant proceedings pending its own determination. The CJT will then only intervene in a matter where it accepts that there is a genuine jurisdictional question for determination as a matter of substance rather than form. It can therefore be expected that spurious or tactical attempts to trigger the CJT’s intervention will be unsuccessful. Moreover, cases referred to the JJC often resulted in lengthy and unpredictable delays. While the CJT mechanism still introduces the possibility of a temporary pause in DIFC proceedings, it is generally regarded as a more streamlined and efficient body than the JJC, and aims to provide decisions within a 30-day timeline.

Takeaways

In the post-reform landscape, the DIFC Courts remain a compelling choice for cross-border disputes, being one of the few Courts in the region capable of deploying powerful enforcement tools at speed. The real lesson of the New Court Law is not about any single remedy or case, but about institutional positioning. The DIFC Courts are refining their jurisdiction within Dubai’s dual-Court system: expansive when acting as an international enforcement court, but otherwise restrained where there is no jurisdictional anchor in the DIFC. The confirmation of the DIFC Court’s commitment to the enforcement principle demonstrates a clear intent to be an active member of the international community of commercial courts seeking to contribute to the rule of law in transnational trade and commerce.²³

At the same time, the CJT adds a strategic constraint to enforcement planning. Where parallel proceedings arise onshore, a CJT referral can have draconian consequences for DIFC enforcement. The practical response is straightforward but often overlooked: enforcement strategies involving the DIFC should be mapped from the outset with the onshore courts in mind, and proceedings should be structured to minimise the CJT risk. The DIFC Courts increasingly rewards parties with a proactive, coherent UAE-wide dispute strategy.

^{1 An anti‑suit injunction restrains a party from commencing or continuing proceedings in another jurisdiction or forum.}

^{2 The ‘conduit’ jurisdiction is a practice that has developed in the DIFC Courts whereby foreign awards or judgments are first recognised in the DIFC Courts with a view to then taking those awards or judgments into ‘onshore’ UAE for enforcement. This practice has evolved in order to take advantage of the streamlined DIFC Court enforcement process.}

^{3 This distinguishes the DIFC from the ADGM, as legislation prevents the ADGM Courts being used as a conduit.}

^{4 Carmon Reestrutura-engenharia E Serviços Técnios Especiais, (Su) LDA v Antonio Joao Catete Lopes Cuenda [2024] DIFC CA 003.}

^{5 It can be assumed that the same would have been true for non-DIFC-seated arbitration proceedings, although there is no direct authority to that effect.}

^{6 (1) Nadil (2) Noshaba V (1) Nameer (2) Naseema [2025] CA and (1) Trafigura PTE LTD (2) Trafigura India PTV LTD v (1) Mr Prateek Gupta (2) Mrs Ginni Gupta [2025] CA 001.}

^{7 In determining the scope of Article 15(4), the words “precautionary measures within the DIFC” were not read as requiring assets to be located in the DIFC.}

^{8 Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd, [2021] UKPC 24 at [84]-[89].}

^{9 Techteryx Ltd v (1) Aria Commodities DMCC (2) Mashreq Bank PSC (3) Emirates Nbd Bank PJSC (4) Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank PJSC [2025] DIFC DEC 001.}

^{10 Techteryx Ltd v Aria Commodities DMCC & Ors, at [55].}

^{11 Orabelle v Orzenia [2026] DIFC CFI ARB 007.}

^{12 Orabelle v Orzenia at [32].}

^{13 In Carmon v Cuenda at [115] and [183], the DIFC Courts noted that “public policy” considerations inform the Courts’ decision to accept jurisdiction. This point was not addressed in Orabelle v Orzenia.}

^{14 Notably, Article 14(5) provides the DIFC Courts the jurisdiction to ratify and recognise arbitral awards in line with the DIFC Arbitration Law.}

^{15 DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008. Article 24(3) provides that the DIFC Court has jurisdiction to grant interim measures in respect of non-DIFC-seated arbitrations. The decision in Orabelle saw the Court decline this jurisdiction.}

^{16 A17 v B17, C17 & D17 [2025] ADGM CFI 001.}

^{17 See for example: Steven Ivankovich v (1) KJM Marine LLC (2) Mohammad Saleh Moosa Hassan Aj Jasmi (3) KJI Marina Boats Manufacturing LLC And (1) KJM Marine LLC (2) KJI Marina Boats Manufacturing LLC v (1) Steven Ivankovich (2) Neirah [2024] DIFC CFI 68 at [42].}

^{18 Oswin v (i) Otila & (ii) Ondray [2025] DIFC CFI ARB 032.}

^{19 (i) Oran & (ii) Oaken v Oved [2026] CA 004.}

^{20 The relevant jurisdictional gateways are contained in Article 14(A) of the New Court Law.}

^{21 Decree No. 29 of 2024, Article 7.}

^{22 Application No. 002/2025 (CJT).}

^{23 (1) Korek Telecom Company LLC (2) Korek International (Management) Limited (3) Sirwan Saber Mustafa v (1) Iraq Telecom Limited for itself and in the name and on behalf of International Holdings Limited (2) International Holdings Limited [2024] DIFC CA 016 at [317].}