Important Clarification on Limits of Crude Oil Export Restrictions

Jun 26, 2014

Reading Time : 2 min

Due to the recent U.S. oil and gas boom, many energy companies, particularly upstream producers, have been seeking to lift the export restrictions on U.S. crude oil to permit the sale of this now more abundant product in overseas markets.  If the U.S. government were to make such a change, it would be either effected through, or accompanied by, changes in the EAR or BIS policy.  Many energy industry observers were consequently quite interested when the WSJ article stated that BIS had issued these rulings “loosen[ing]” the ban on crude oil exports.

However, a high-level BIS official clarified to us that these rulings do not constitute a change in BIS policy, but do seek to provide a basic test for what falls outside the definition of “crude oil” for purposes of the export restriction.  Specifically, the “rulings” that these companies received were commodity classification determinations (“CCATS”), regulatory filings under the EAR used to determine what export classification and associated controls apply to specific items.  Legally, CCATS apply only to the requestors and with respect to the specific facts of the request, and are not made public. Nevertheless, to the extent their contents are shared, they can provide a basis for comparison and assessment.  These rulings stated that if crude oil goes through a distillation tower, including a splitter, the result is a petroleum product not subject to the export restrictions on crude oil.  Through this CCATS, BIS is apparently attempting to provide a clear test that is consistent with the EAR regulatory definition of crude oil and that responds to the large number of requests from energy companies that BIS has received on this question.

While this ruling provides some clarity, potential exporters may still not be able to determine exactly where the line is drawn between crude oil and “petroleum products” for export purposes.  For instance, BIS does not provide a definition of what constitutes a “distillation tower.”   A standard distillation tower would clearly pass regulatory muster under this rule, but query whether the most minimal distillation would be sufficient to permit the output to be exported.  In light of such potential ambiguity, we anticipate that further engagement with BIS may be necessary for potential exporters to gain comfort prior to entering into these transactions and investing capital on operations that are based on these regulatory rulings.

Share This Insight

Previous Entries

Speaking Energy

July 8, 2026

On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the Commission) issued an order to ISO New England Inc. (ISO-NE) directing ISO-NE and ISO-NE participating transmission owners to show cause as to why ISO-NE’s tariff should not be found to be unjust and unreasonable (ISO New England Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,215 (2026) (Order)) because it fails to sufficiently:

...

Read More

Speaking Energy

July 7, 2026

On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in Leonard Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. (Hoffmann), which presents the question whether section 7 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA) requires pipeline companies using federal eminent domain authority to pay landowners’ attorney’s fees in states where landowners can recover those fees under state law. In the decision giving rise to the Supreme Court’s review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a group of ranchers were not entitled to recover their $383,300 in attorney’s fees incurred while negotiating their compensation—creating a circuit split with four other courts of appeals. Hoffmann will be heard during the Court’s October 2026 Term, and marks the second time in five years that the Court has agreed to interpret NGA section 7.

...

Read More

Speaking Energy

July 6, 2026

On June 29, 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued Trump v. Slaughter, fundamentally reshaping presidential removal authority over independent regulatory agencies. The decision overruled a 90-year-old precedent established in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which had upheld the constitutionality of commissioner removal protections in the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). As written, the FTC Act permits a commissioner’s removal “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” In Slaughter, the Court was asked to reevaluate this standard following the President’s removal of a Democratic-appointed FTC commissioner from office in 2025 without cause. Finding for the President, the Court held that removal was permissible because the FTC Act’s for-cause removal protections for commissioners violate the separation of powers, specifically, the President’s removal power under Article II. The Court explained that the FTC exercises executive power because it promulgates binding rules, investigates and enforces those rules through administrative adjudications, and brings civil enforcement actions in federal court. It found that because it exercises these executive powers, its commissioners “must therefore be controlled by the Chief Executive, in whom such power is vested.” While previous recent cases addressing the scope of the Removal Power, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Collins v. Yellen purported to preserve some kernel of Humphrey’s, the Court made clear that “[i]f anything more is left of Humphrey’s, we overrule it.”

...

Read More

Speaking Energy

June 25, 2026

On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the Commission) issued an order to the California Independent System Operator Corporation (CAISO) directing CAISO and CAISO transmission owners to show cause as to why CAISO’s tariff should not be found to be unjust and unreasonable (California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 195 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2026) (the Order)) because it fails to sufficiently:

...

Read More

© 2026 Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. All rights reserved. Attorney advertising. This document is distributed for informational use only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be used as such. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Akin is the practicing name of Akin Gump LLP, a New York limited liability partnership authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority under number 267321. A list of the partners is available for inspection at Eighth Floor, Ten Bishops Square, London E1 6EG. For more information about Akin Gump LLP, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP and other associated entities under which the Akin Gump network operates worldwide, please see our Legal Notices page.